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Citadels of Privilege:
Exclusionary Land Use
Regulations and the Presumption
of Constitutional Validity
By ANNrTE B. KoLIs*
The housing dilemma has become increasingly acute in recent
years. The escalation in housing prices is so well documented, it
scarcely requires note.1 The concern today is not merely that many
may not achieve the "American Dream" of owning a single family
detached home in the suburbs. The concern for many has become
that rental units may not be available, and if available, may be
unaffordable.2
* B.A., 1975, Knox College; J.D., 1978, Washington University St. Louis. Currently Law
Clerk to the Honorable William L. Hungate, Federal District Court, Eastern District of
Missouri.
1. For example, the median sales price of new private single-family houses nationwide
has increased from $23,400 in 1970 to $55,700 in 1978, an increase of 238%. U.S. DSPT OF
COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITrD STATES, 1979, at
792 (100th ed. 1979).
2. See generally DIvsIoN OF POLICY STUDIES, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RE-
SEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URB. DEV., Tim CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING TO CONDO-
mimums AND CooPERATIvEs: A NATIONAL STUDY OF SCOPE, CAUSES AND IMPACTS I-II (June
1980) ("The rapid growth of conversion activity has coincided with an apparent decline in
the profitability of building and operating multi-family rental housing. Reasons for this de-
cline include higher operating and maintenance costs, higher land and construction costs for
new apartments, changes in federal tax law, and increased government regula-
tion-including rent control in a few areas. Many see these changes contributing to a long-
term shortage of affordable rental housing. Some observers have asked whether they will
lead eventually to the end of unsubsidized rental housing in this country."); CONG. REc. H
10096 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1980). ("Unless the Congress acts soon, the crisis in rental housing
will lead to far more drastic solutions that will be many times more costly. The Congress
must act to increase the rental housing stock of this Nation. Not to do so is to condemn low
and moderate income families to untenable housing conditions and to place inordinate hous-
ing cost burdens on all rental families.") (remarks of Congressman Ashley); CONG. REc. S
13953 (daily ed. Sept 30, 1980) ("Lending by federally insured lending institutions for the
conversion of rental housing to condominium and cooperative housing should be discour-
aged where there are adverse impacts on housing opportunities of the low and moderate
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Restrictive municipal land use policies have contributed to
this adverse situation. This is due, in part, to the use by municipal-
ities of their regulatory powers to preserve the status quo: to pre-
serve existing physical/structural character, environmental quali-
ties, economic viability, or perhaps even to preserve the
homogenous socio-economic character of a community. In order to
preserve the status quo, municipalities may exclude those land
uses which appear to detract from the perceived advantages of the
community. 8 These exclusions frequently impact development of
housing suitable for low or moderate income dwellers. Those indi-
viduals who directly or indirectly bear the burden of these restric-
tive municipal policies are often unable to successfully challenge
the policies, 4 partially because municipal land use regulatory poli-
cies are traditionally accorded a strong presumption of validity by
reviewing courts.5
This article will contrast the traditionally deferential approach
of courts like the United States Supreme Court with several inno-
vative state court approaches to restrictive land use regulations.6
income and elderly and handicapped tenants involved.") (remarks of Senator Proxmire dis-
cussing § 603 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1980).
3. See R. FIHMAN, HouSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW 41 (i978) ("[F]rom the beginning,
zoning in the United States was commonly used as a device to exclude undesirable persons
or groups."); Bosselman, Growth Management and Constitutional Rights: The States
Search for a Growth Policy (pt. II), 11 Usw. L. ANN. 3 (1976)("IT]he dilemma [is that] [o]n
the one hand, people want to move to new locations in order to improve their living environ-
ment and enjoy a better lifestyle. On the other hand, an improved living environment re-
quires restrictions on the number of people who can live in an area, thus limiting the ability
of some people to migrate and settle in various parts of the country.").
4. Plaintiffs are often unable to satisfy the "standing" requirement, particularly in
federal courts. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), in which the Court held that
neither low and moderate income individuals nor developer plaintiffs had standing to chal-
lenge a town's exclusionary land use regulation. The Court found no concrete injury from
existing regulation: the town had not denied permission to develop any specific low/moder-
ate income housing project. The relief requested was prospective, speculative, and therefore
lacking "ripeness to warrant judicial intervention." Id: at 516. State courts vary in the strin-
gency of interpreting standing requirements, although there appears to be a trend toward a
more liberal approach. R. FisHMA, supra note 3, at 132 n.29.
5. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Ybarra v. Los Altos
Hills, 370 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974). See generally
the comprehensive annotation in 1 R. AN ansON, AmFmcAN LAW OF ZOsNo 2d § 3.14 (Supp.
1980).
6. See Godschalk, Growth Management Policy Considerations, in URBAN LAND INSTI-
TUTE, MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GRowTH V, 9, 10 (1980) ("Judicial interpretations of
constitutional issues related to growth management can be thought of as a continuum that
stretches from traditional positions derived from earlier decisions based heavily on protec-
tion of private property to newei positions that attempt to incorporate a broadened view of
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The comparison is intended to delineate those analytical ap-
proaches which preclude judicial consideration of the actual pur-
poses behind municipal restrictions, or which preclude judicial in-
quiry into whether the purposes asserted can actually be
accomplished by the regulatory devices selected. This article will
suggest that deferential judicial approaches may unnecessarily,
perhaps unjustifiably, permit local governments to exclude low and
moderate income residents.7
the social and environmental impact of growth management."); Note, Regulation of Land
Use: From Magna Carta to a Just Formulation, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 904, 905, 918 (1976)
(recent case law trend suggesting that land ownership no longer includes a right to develop).
Supreme Court decisions are used in this article to illustrate a traditional deferential judi-
cial approach to land use restrictions. Some commentators suggest a reason for the Supreme
Court's deferential approach. federalism, i.e., the notion that zoning issues are best confided
to state and local governments with judicial review left to the state courts. See Sager, Insu-
lar Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc., 91 HAv. L. Rzv. 1373 (1978). Challenges to restrictive policies which are based on
national concerns, such as interstate commerce, voting or free speech, are deemed by some
best decided by federal courts. See Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and
Legal Analysis, 86 YAZ L.J. 385, 471 (1977). Other commentators assert that state courts
should decide challenges under potentially broader state constitutional provisions where: (1)
there is no need for national uniformity in the law;, or (2) the Supreme Court has declared a
"hands off" policy toward a certain class of disputes; or (3) the states attempt to innova-
tively respond to complex contemporary social and economic problems without adverse im-
pact to the rest of the country. See Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the
Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. Rav. 873, 937-40 (1976). Notwithstanding whether the
Supreme Court's deference to local legislative judgments is legitimate, the Court's deferen-
tial stance is sufficiently illustrative to provide a touchstone for a comparison between tradi-
tional and innovative judicial approaches. But see Callies, The Supreme Court is Wrong
About Zoning by Popular Vote, 42 PLAN. 17 (1976).
7. For an excellent article reflecting an opposing view, see Rose, Myths and Miscon-
ceptions of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 8 Rm% EsT. L.J. 99 (1979). The author asserts
that among the "myths and misconceptions" of exclusionary zoning litigation are:
(1) the myth of the moral imperative: A fair evaluation of the benefits and costs
of eliminating exclusionary zoning would put the plaintiff on the side of virtue and
justice.
(2) the myth of the legal imperative: The supreme law of the land, the United
States Constitution, is violated by suburban exclusionary zoning.
(3) the myth that exclusionary zoning is the "evil force": If exclusionary zoning is
eliminated, the social and economic inequities of our society will be eliminated
also.
Id. at 102. The author asserts that the "elimination of exclusionary zoning will not provide
housing for low and moderate income families." Id. at 123. Rather, elimination will result in
windfall profits through increased land values to developers and real estate investors who in
turn may not be compelled to construct low cost housing. Id. at 124.
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I. Municipal Powers: Traditional Judicial Review
Municipalities are delegated authority by states in enabling
acts to regulate land use for the "health, safety, morals, and gen-
eral public welfare." 8 The means by which these "police power"
purposes may be accomplished are generally within the broad dis-
cretion of municipalities. 9
Traditional courts defer to local legislative judgment10 for sev-
8. Many states have adopted enabling legislation based on the model of the Depart-
ment of Commerce's 1922 Standard State Zoning Enabling Act and 1928 Standard State
Planning Enabling Act. States also provide specific authority to municipalities in subdivi-
sion, planned unit development and annexation legislation. These Acts delegate the "state's
sovereign authority" to regulate land use "to literally thousands of local governments
throughout the nation," and often fail to provide a "mechanism for coordination among
jurisdictions": "The fragmentation or balkanization of authority that has thereby re-
sulted-with each community acting independently of its neighbors and attempting to solve
its own parochial needs without regard to potential impacts of its decisions on surrounding
areas-has proved to be a major obstacle to dealing with problems that are areawide in
scope (such as housing, transportation, pollution, education)." R. FISHMAN, supra note 3, at
51-52. In response to this fragmentation, at least twenty-one states have enacted statewide
planning statutes in order to coordinate development between jurisdictions. CouNc. OF
STATE GOvERNMENTS (COG), LAND: STATE ALTERNATIVES FOR PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT
10-11, Fig. 1 (1975). See F. BosSELMAN & D. CALLiES, THE Qumr RaVOLuTnON IN LAND USE
CONTROL (1971). For a recent compilation of state enabling acts and analysis of provisions
specifically authorizing municipal fiscal impact analysis in land use regulations, see Bur-
chell, Fiscal Impact Analysis as a Tool for Land Use Regulation, 7 REAL EST. L.J. 132, 135-
48 (1978).
Such authority also may be delegated by a Home Rule provision in a state constitution.
See, e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 7.
9. Land use regulations "must find their justification in some aspect of the police
power asserted for the public welfare," according to Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). Police power ordinances are valid only if they are "really designed
to accomplish a legitimate public purpose." Chicago B. & 0. Ry. v. Drainage Comm'rs, 200
U.S. 561, 592 (1906).
Whether contemporary zoning is in fact based upon the public welfare has been subject
to debate. See Sayre, Aesthetics and Property Values: Does Zoning Promote Public Wel-
fare?, 35 A.B.A.J. 471, 472 (1949). One view asserts that zoning is no longer based on the
public welfare. Babcock & Feurer, Land as a Commodity "Affected with a Public Interest,"
52 WASH. L. REv. 289, 291 (1977). Rather, it is "a contest between competing private inter-
ests in real estate: the developer versus the protesting property owners or neighbors," which
frequently results in "outrageous municipal practices that discourage or prevent develop-
ment." Id. at 300.
10. The distinction between local government legislative as opposed to administrative
or "quasi-judicial" actions is relevant to the degree of judicial scrutiny applied in a given
case. Municipal recognition that traditional self-executing zoning is frequently inadequate
to respond to the complex problems of increased urbanization has prompted local govern-
ments to move toward new regulatory devices intended to maintain greater current discre-
tion over land use decisions. These "wait-and-see" devices include rezonings, variances,
amendments, special exceptions or permits, floating zones, conditional rezonings and
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eral reasons: the separation of powers, a perceived lack of judicial
expertise in land use matters, and the desire to allow local govern-
mental flexibility in meeting changing conditions with innovative
responses."' Local land use regulations come to these courts armed
with a formidable presumption of validity, and challengers often
must bear the burden of proving that the statute is invalid. Chal-
lenges are based on theories that the regulation:
1. violates the equal protection clause;
2. violates the due process clause;
3. is outside the scope of the enabling legislation; or
4. is not a proper exercise of the police power.12
These challenges require the court to make three queries:
1. Is the objective sought a legitimate police power pur-
pose within the purposes specified in the enabling
legislation?
2. Are the means utilized reasonably related to the accom-
plishment of this legitimate purpose?
3. Is the effect of the means employed unduly oppressive
upon the challenger, or do the means infringe a consti-
tutionally protected interest of the challenger?13
planned unit developments. These devices provide municipalities needed flexibility, but also
afford them "an opportunity to abuse their discretion" by excluding on an ad hoc basis. R.
FISHMAN, supra note 3, at 45-49. In response to this potential for abuse, innovative courts
have held that certain rezonings are quasi-judicial, thus requiring greater procedural safe-
guards for participants. See, e.g., Snyder v. City of Lakewood, 542 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1975);
Town v. Land Use Comm'n, 524 P.2d 84 (Hawaii 1974); Golden v. City of Overland Park,
584 P.2d 130 (Kan. 1978); Lowe v. City of Missoula, 525 P.2d 551 (Mont. 1974); Fasano v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973); Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr.
Corp., 202 S.E.2d 889 (Va. 1974). See generally Kolis, Zoning Amendments: Legislative v.
Quasi-Judicial Hearings, URB. LA m 24 (July/Aug. 1979).
Local government actions deemed legislative receive a narrow scope of judicial review.
Local actions deemed quasi-judicial or administrative may receive stricter judicial scrutiny,
although "[i]n practice, review is usually narrow, because courts apply both a presumption
that findings were made and that they were supported by sufficient evidence." R. FsHMAN,
supra note 3, at 145.
11. See Mandelker, Differential Enforcement of Housing Codes-The Constitutional
Dimension, 55 U. D=T. J. UEB. L. 517, 534-35 n.77 (1978).
12. See Rose, Exclusionary Zoning and Managed Growth: Some Unresolved Issues, in
URBAN LAND INSTITUT, MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH V 169, 179 (1980).
13. Although the challenges ipay be based upon separate constitutional or statutory
bases, the line drawn between judicial analyses is often unclear. This is due, in part, to
plaintiffs generally challenging restrictive regulations on several separate points of alleged
constitutional infringement or statutory violation. Thus, plaintiffs may allege violations of
both due process and equal protection clauses in addition to challenging the police power
Spring 1981]
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The means utilized by municipalities to restrict land use, to
maintain the status quo, are infrequently subject to close scrutiny
by the courts. Municipalities rarely employ land use regulatory de-
vices which have not been validated previously by the courts in
similar or related contexts.14 The means generally become relevant
only when regulations are enacted for improper purposes or when
action as "ultra vires."
Due process challenges are based on the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution:
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation," U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is applied to the states through the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "No state shall ... deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Courts generally hold that municipal regulation
does not constitute a "taking" in violation of the due process clauses unless substantially all
economic use of the property is deprived by the regulation. In cases when a taking is found
to have occurred, courts will merely require the regulation to be stricken as opposed to
requiring monetary compensation. See Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation
Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491 (1981). General due process challenges allege that gov-
ernmental action is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, without a rational basis, unrelated
to any legitimate police power purpose, and that the means are not reasonably related to
any legitimate purpose. See Godschalk, supra note 6, at 11. "this general due process con-
cept ... prohibits in a general way certain kinds of activities that are also proscribed in a
more specific way through other constitutional provisions. For example, the regional general
welfare challenge and the right to travel challenge seem to derive from the requirement of a
legitimate objective. The equal protection challenge is highly related to the general due pro-
cess requirement that the means be reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of the
ends. The taking challenge is often raised where it is claimed that the means are unduly
oppressive on the individual, in violation of general due process." Id.
Equal protection challenges are based on the Fourteenth Amendment. The stringency
of judicial review depends upon the challenge asserted, that is, whether the classification
affects economic or "fundamental" interests or a constitutionally suspect category. When
the classification affects economic interests, courts generally employ a relaxed scrutiny simi-
lar to a general due process analysis and uphold classifications which arguably bear some
relationship to the purpose asserted for regulation. Mandelker, supra note 11, at 557. Courts
will apply a strict scrutiny standard of review when the classification affects fundamental
interests or suspect categories such as race or religion. Id. at 558-59.
14. One regulatory tool has, however, come under attack recently in several state
courts: this is a moratorium on building or related permits. Courts frequently strike such
provisions unless the local government intends to utilize the device as a temporary regula-
tory measure. See, e.g., City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villa Corp., 371 So.2d 154 (Fla. Dist Ct.
App. 1979), and its companion case, City of Boca Raton v. Arvida Corp., 371 So.2d 160 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (the court invalidated the city's charter which provided that "[n]o
building permit shall be issued for the construction of a dwelling unit within the city which
would permit the total number of dwelling units within the city to exceed 40,00," because
the population cap did not bear a rational relationship to a valid municipal purpose);
Sturges v. Town of Chilmark, 402 N.E.2d 1346 (Mass. 1980) (upholding the constitutionality
of a municipal ordinance which limited the availability of building permits to no more than
one-tenth of the lots in a subdivision both in the year the lots are subdivided and in each of
the subsequent ten years, since the restriction was temporary and comprehensive planning
studies were underway).
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they result in an improper effect.
The effect of municipal regulatory devices is generally a more
revealing query. Yet, even the effects generally enjoy a presump-
tion of validity.15 The literature in this field is replete with discus-
sions of regulatory devices which, although not facially exclusion-
ary nor explicitly promulgated for exclusionary purposes, may
nonetheless have an exclusionary effect. These exclusionary regula-
tory devices include:
1. large-lot zoning;
2. minimum house size, bedroom number, or frontage and
lot width requirements;
3. overzoning for nonresidential uses;
4. prohibition of multi-family housing;
5. prohibition of mobile homes;
6. unnecessarily high subdivision requirements; and
7. administrative practices.""
Similarly, the purposes for which these restrictions are en-
acted are rarely subject to close scrutiny once those purposes ap-
pear to fall under the umbrella of the "general welfare.' 1 7 As long
15. Regardless of municipal intent, the inevitable effect of land use devices is to ex-
clude certain uses and therefore certain classes of people. Walsh, Alternatives to Warth v.
Seldin: The Potential Resident Challenger of an Exclusionary Zoning Scheme, 11 URw. L.
ANN. 223 (1976). The Supreme Court has stated: "In many instances, to recognize the lim-
ited probative value of disproportionate impact is merely to acknowledge the 'heterogeneity'
of the Nation's population." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 266 n.15 (1977).
16. See R. FSHMAN, supra note 3, at 54-56. See also Williams & Norman, Exclusion-
ary Land Use Controls: The Case of Northeastern New Jersey, 22 SYRAcusE L. Rv. 475,
481-84 (1971) (minimum building size requirements directly influence housing costs; single
family unit restrictions effectively preclude those for whom the most economically feasible
housing-is some form of multiple dwelling;, the number of bedrooms is often restricted when
multiple dwellings are permitted; prohibiting mobile homes may discourage the immigration
of inner city residents who cannot afford more expensive housing; large lot requirements not
only increase costs to homeowners but curtail the availability of land for multi-family
dwellings).
17. See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). "When... because the courts stand ready to credit as acceptable
any goal the political branches regard as conducive to the general welfare-the class of ac-
ceptable (sub)goals is infinitely expandable at the discretion of the political branches, a re-
quirement of a rational choice/goal relation for every choice is no demand at all." Id. at
1248.
Part of the judiciary's reluctance to scrutinize closely municipal purposes for restric-
tions is the difficulty of ascertaining such purposes, and also a reluctance to invalidate
facially valid restrictions because of the illegitimate intent of one or a few legislators. See
generally Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
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as a municipality asserts some accepted police power purpose as
the basis of a restriction which may have an exclusionary effect,
the reviewing court will generally bow to the municipality's judg-
ment. Municipalities are usually astute enough to assert justifica-
tions which are acceptable to the contemporary judiciary."' As the
Seventh Circuit noted in Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights:19
As overtly bigoted behavior has become more unfashionable, evi-
dence of [discriminatory] intent has become harder to find. But
this does not mean that racial discrimination has disappeared.
We cannot agree that [the legislature] . . . intended to permit
municipalities to systematically deprive minorities of housing op-
portunities simply because those municipalities act discreetly.20
In recent years, the potential for municipalities to "act dis-
creetly" has expanded dramatically. Increased concern for the en-
tvironment, in addition to increasing fiscal strains on municipalities
caused by rapid growth, have provided municipalities with a
(1977): "Rarely can it be said that a legislature or administrative body operating under a
broad mandate made a decision motivated by a single concern, or even that a particular
purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one. In fact, it is because legislators and adminis-
trators are properly concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations that
courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness
or irrationality." Id. at 265. See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968): "Inquir-
ies into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is simply
the interpretation of legislation, the court will look to statements by legislators for guidance
as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit to sound decisionmaking in this
circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the possibility of misreading Congress' purpose. It
is an entirely different matter when we are asked to void a statute that is, under well-settled
criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen
said about it. What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessa-
rily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to
eschew guesswork. We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation
which Congress had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact
form if the same or another legislator made a wiser speech about it." Id. at 383-84.
18. Cf. Ely, supra note 17. "Laws like that involved in Brown [v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954)], which on their face distinguished on the basis of race, were readily
taken care of, or at least the Court felt, in traditional equal protection terms without exam-
ining motivation. But it was not long before recalcitrant officials began to seek the same
results by measures not explicitly racial .... Unless the promise of Brown was to go unful-
filled, it seemed inevitable that the doctrine of unconstitutional motivation would be
wheeled back into the judicial arsenal when a flagrant enough situation arose." Id. at 1209.
19. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). The case was
heard on remand from the United States Supreme Court. See Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
20. 558 F.2d at 1290.
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wealth of new justifying purposes for restrictive regulations.2' In
the absence of definitive evidence to support or refute the success
of local regulatory responses to alleviate complex environmental or
fiscal problems, courts may be particularly willing to defer to the
expertise and judgment of local governments in choosing appropri-
ate. responses. 2
Unfortunately, this judicial stance may preclude scrutiny of
the actual purposes behind potentially exclusionary municipal land
use devices. As noted by one well-respected commentator:
[One] reason for environmentalists' opposition to homebuilding is
that the concept of the environment is a loose one easily stretch-
ed to include many values and purposes. In suburban America,
preserving the environment usually means preserving the social
status quo as well. If no open land is to be developed, then new-
comers cannot move into a town except through the gradual turn-
over of older housing.2 s
As long as a municipality asserts a laudable public purpose for a
land use restriction, such as environmental protection, the tradi-
tional court will presume that the restriction is constitutionally
valid. The burden of proving an invalid purpose is on the chal-
lenger. Until an invalid purpose is asserted, the traditional court
will generally not inquire whether the ordinance will, in fact,
achieve its professed purpose or what other purposes may have
prompted its enactment.24
Some state courts have begun to pierce the presumption of le-
gitimacy with closer judicial scrutiny.25 This has been accom-
21. See generally Bosselman, supra note 3. "Recognizing the weakness of basing re-
strictive measures on arbitrary standards, advocates of growth management have long
searched for more defensible standards for basing growth limitations. Particularly attractive
to advocates of growth management is the concept of 'carrying capacity,' which has been
widely used by ecologists in wildlife management .. .. Efforts to use carrying capacity
methodology to determine standards for human population are in their infancy and it is far
too soon to pass judgment on their success." Id. at 33-34.
22. Cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) ("[T]he city
must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly seri-
ous problems.").
23. B. FRmDAN, TnE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION HUSTLE 129 (1979).
24. See note 17 supra.
25. Most state courts prefer, however, to invalidate restrictive municipal regulations
on statutory as opposed to constitutional grounds. Ellickson, supra note 6, at 474. Cf. Vil-
lage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). "In the realm of constitutional law
... this Court has perceived the embarrassment which is likely to result from an attempt to
formulate rules or decide questions beyond the necessities of the immediate issue. It has
Spring 19811 LAND USE SYMPOSIUM
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plished by redefining the "general welfare" to include the welfare
of the region, excluding from legitimate police power purposes the
maintenance of a municipality's status quo, or by finding suspect
those regulatory devices which effectively exclude low and moder-
ate income residents."6 When presented with regulations which
have an exclusionary effect, these courts may accord the regulation
a "relaxed" presumption of validity, or may reverse the traditional
presumption entirely to accord the regulation a presumption of in-
validity. These approaches lighten the burden of proof for the
challenger: the burden is shifted to the municipality to show that
the regulation is a legitimate exercise of its police powers. Under
this approach, the court may go so far as to inquire whether the
regulatory device utilized is not just reasonable, but necessary, to
accomplish some legitimate governmental goal. The court may also
substitute its own judgment for that of the municipality when de-
termining the true purpose behind a municipal ordinance. 7
Traditional courts, like the United States Supreme Court, do
not journey so far into the rubric of the asserted "public welfare"
purpose for a restrictive local regulation. 8 These courts do inquire
into the purposes asserted for a municipal regulation, but will de-
fer to local judgments unless the restriction is clearly "arbitrary or
preferred to follow the method of a gradual approach to the general by a systematically
guarded application and extension of constitutional principles to particular cases as they
arise, rather than by out of hand attempts to establish general rules to which future cases
must be fitted. This process applies with peculiar force to the solution of questions arising
under the due process clause of the Constitution as applied to the exercise of the flexible
powers of police. .. ." Id. at 397.
26. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Ber-
enson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236 (1975); Nickola v. Township of
Grand Blanc, 394 Mich. 589, 232 N.W.2d 604 (1975); Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391
Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974); Appeal of Kit Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d
765 (1970); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v.
Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). See also Construction Indus. As'n v. City of
Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Golden v. Town Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291
(1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). See generally R. FISHMAN, supra note 3.
"[A] local jurisdiction, in exercising its zoning powers, is acting only as a delegate of the
state... the 'general welfare' that must be served extends beyond the borders of the par-
ticular municipality." Id. at 57. Brower, Courts Move Toward a Redefinition of General
Welfare, 31 LAND Us PLAN. & ZONING DIG. (1979).
27. See generally Godschalk, supra note 6; Hynes-Cherin & Cohen, The Role of
Courts in Land Use: An Overview, in URBAN LAND INSTrrUTE, MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF
GROWTH V, at 31 (1980).
28. See note 6 supra.
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unreasonable" or unconstitutionally infringes upon a recognized
constitutional right or "fundamental interest" of the challenger.29
Since the Supreme Court does not deem access to housing a "fun-
damental interest"30 and does not consider economic discrimina-
tion to be a violation of the equal protection clause,3 1 successful
challenges to exclusionary zoning will be few in deferential courts.
II. The Supreme Court
A. The Foundation
The Court stated in its first seminal zoning decision, Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,82 that zoning regulations are pre-
sumed constitutionally valid until it is shown that the "provisions
are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial rela-
29. See generally Rose, supra note 12. "[A]bsent a clear constitutional violation, such
as blatant racial discrimination, federal [deferential] courts are reluctant to interfere too
actively with municipal zoning since zoning is an exercise of the police power reserved to the
states." Id. at 176.
30. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) "We do not denigrate the importance of
decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies
for every social and economic ill, We are unable to perceive in that document any constitu-
tional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality ... .Absent constitutional
mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and definition of landlord-tenant relationships
are legislative, not judicial, functions." Id. at 74. See also Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) "Nor is there reason to subject the
Village's action to more stringent review simply because it involves respondents' interest in
securing housing." Id. at 259 n.5 (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972)). See
generally San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-39 (1973).
31. "Case law reveals that wealth-based differentiations are struck only when they re-
sult in injury to rights considered fundamental by the Supreme Court. Wealth discrimina-
tion has been found unconstitutional in cases dealing with voting rights [Harper v. Board of
Elections, 388 U.S. 663 (1966)] and criminal appeals [Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974);
Bodie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)] ....
"Two other decisions, James v. Valtierra [402 U.S. 137 (1971)] and San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez [411 U.S. 1 (1972)] reveal the Supreme Court's reluc-
tance to treat economic opportunities for lower income groups as fundamental or to give
wealth-based discrimination the suspect labeL" Mandelker, supra note 11, at 571-72.
32. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Plaintiff alleged that the municipality's adoption of a zoning
ordinance which restricted his property to residential use was an unconstitutional taking
under the due process clause and denied him equal protection under law. Plaintiff sought an
injunction against the threatened application of the ordinance: he had neither sought nor
been denied a building permit; he merely contended that he could not sell the land for
industrial uses.
The Court did not strictly scrutinize the ordinance because plaintiff had not demon-
strated a "present infringement or denial of a specific right." Id. at 395.
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tion to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare":33
The ordinance now under review, and all similar laws and regula-
tions, must find their justification in some aspect of the police
power, asserted for the public welfare. The line which in this field
separates the legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of
power is not capable of precise delimitation. It varies with cir-
cumstances and conditions."
The Court noted that comprehensive reports of "[c]ommissions
and experts... which bear every evidence of painstaking consid-
eration" illustrate that zoning ordinances which "segregat[e] . . .
residential, business, and industrial buildings," promote the gen-
eral welfare by:35
1. facilitating the provision of "fire apparatus suitable for
the character and intensity of the development in each
section";
2. increasing "the safety and security of home life";
3. preventing "street accidents, especially to children, by
reducing the traffic and resulting confusion in residen-
tial sections";
4. decreasing "noise and other conditions which produce
or intensify nervous disorders"; and
5. preserving "a more favorable environment in which to
rear children." 6
The Court found that municipal separation of land uses was justi-
fied by and rationally related to the municipality's purpose of pro-
33. Id.
34. Id. at 387.
35. Id. at 394.
36. Id. The Court took special note of the appropriateness of segregating apartment
houses from detached single family homes in order to protect residents from the in-effects of
apartments. "[T]he development of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the com-
ing of apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in destroying the entire section for
private house purposes . . . [V]ery often the apartment house is a mere parasite, con-
structed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created
by the residential character of the district. Moreover, the coming of one apartment house is
followed by others, interfering by their height and bulk with the free circulation of air and
monopolizing the rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon the smaller homes, and
bringing, as their necessary accompaniments, the disturbing noises incident to increased
traffic and business, and the occupation, by means of moving and parked automobiles, of
larger portions of the streets, thus detracting from their safety and depriving children of the
privilege of quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in more favored localities,
until, finally, the residential character of the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of
detached residences are utterly destroyed." Id.
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moting health and safety.3 7
The Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker8 provided a
description of the scope of police power which is frequently quoted
by traditionally deferential courts. 9 Appellants contended that
Congress could not legitimately exercise its power of eminent do-
main over their department store "merely to develop a better bal-
anced, more attractive community" as opposed to condemning
property "for the purpose of ridding the area of slums. ' 40 The
Court stated that "[s]ubject to specific constitutional limitations,
when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been de-
clared in terms well-nigh conclusive": 41
We deal ... with what traditionally has been known as the police
power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is
fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts. The definition
is essentially the product of legislative determinations addressed
to the purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly nor
historically capable of complete definition .... The concept of
the public welfare is broad and inclusive .... The values it rep-
resents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as mone-
tary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.42
Congress' expressed legislative purpose in the act under considera-
tion was "to protect and promote the welfare of the inhabitants of
the seat of the Government by eliminating all [substandard hous-
ing and blighted areas] by employing all means necessary and ap-
propriate for the purpose." 43 The Court deferred to Congress' judg-
ment "that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as
sanitary" and held that such a purpose would not violate the due
process clause under the Fifth Amendment.4
37. Id. at 397.
38. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
39. Berman is frequently cited by courts which uphold local zoning regulations en-
acted to promote aesthetic purposes. See generally Kolis, Architectural Expression: Police
Power and the First Amendment, 16 URB. L. ANN. 273, 283 n.37 (1979).
40. 348 U.S. at 31.
41. Id. at 32.
42. Id. at 32-33.
43. Id. at 28.
44. Id. at 33.
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B. Foundation Applied
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 5 the Court considered the
constitutional legitimacy of a small municipality's ordinance which
expressly prohibited lodging, boarding, fraternity or multiple
dwelling housing. The only permitted residential structures under
the ordinance were single family units, and the ordinance did not
include in the definition of "family" groups of more than two unre-
lated individuals.48
Plaintiffs in Belle Terre contended that the ordinance uncon-
stitutionally denied them equal protection of the law.47 The Court
cited its decision in Euclid in support of the presumed validity of
legislative classifications which are not "wholly arbitrary,"48 and
which bear a rational relationship to a permissible state objective.49
The Court "refused to limit the concept of public welfare that may
be enhanced by zoning regulations. ' 50 The Court held that Belle
Terre's ordinance was a legitimate exercise of its police powers to
promote legitimate public purposes:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehi-
cles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project ad-
dressed to family needs. This goal is a permissible one .... The
45. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
46. Id. at 2.
47. Id. at 7. Plaintiffs challenged the ordinance "on several grounds: that it interferes
with a person's right to travel; that it interferes with the right to migrate to and settle
within a State; that it bars people who are uncongenial to the present residents; that it
expresses the social preferences of the residents for groups that will be congenial to them;
that social homogeneity is not a legitimate interest of government; that the restriction...
trenches on the newcomers' rights of privacy; that it is of no rightful concern to villagers
whether the residents are married or unmarried; that the ordinance is antithetical to the
Nation's experience, ideology, and self-perception as an open, egalitarian, and integrated
society." Id.
48. Id. at 4.
49. Id. at 8. The Court found no improper purpose for the ordinance: "It is not aimed
at transients. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618. It involves no procedural disparity
inflicted on some but not on others such as was presented by Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12.
It involves no 'fundamental' right guaranteed by the Constitution, such as voting, Harper u.
Virginia Board, 383 U.S. 663; the right of association, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449;
the right of access to the courts, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415; or any rights of privacy,
cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-454. We
deal with economic and social legislation where legislatures have historically drawn lines
which we respect against the charge of violation of the Equal Protection Clause if the law be
' "reasonable, not arbitrary"'. . . and bears 'a rational relationship to a [permissible] state
objective."' Id. at 7-8 (footnote omitted).
50. Id. at 5 (discussing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).
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police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and
unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values,
youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air
make the area a sanctuary for people.5 1
Presented with an asserted infringement of First Amendment
rights, the Court more closely scrutinized the purposes for which
the restriction was enacted. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,52
plaintiffs challenged the facial validity of the city's ordinance
which prohibited movies with nudity in drive-in theaters when the
screen was visible from a public street or place. 3 The city asserted
three police power purposes for the ordinance:
1. to protect its citizens against unwilling exposure to
materials that may be offensive; 54
2. to protect children from offensive materials;55 and
3. to prevent the distraction of passing motorists in order
to decrease the likelihood of accidents.5
The Court scrutinized the asserted justifications and found them
inadequate since the ordinance infringed upon expression pro-
tected by the First Amendment: "[W]e do not deprecate the legiti-
mate interests asserted by the city.. . . We hold only that the
present ordinance does not satisfy the rigorous constitutional stan-
dards that apply when government attempts to regulate
expression. 1 '57
In Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.,58 the Court was
again presented with a case in which a police power restriction was
alleged to infringe upon First Amendment interests.59 The City of
51. 416 U.s. at 9.
52. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
53. Id. at 206-07.
54. Id. at 208.
55. Id. at 212.
56. Id. at 214.
57. Id. at 217. The Court stated that the first justification cited by the City was insuf-
ficient to justify the restriction: "[T]he limited privacy interest of persons on the public
street cannot justify this censorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis of content."
Id. at 212. The second justification advanced was deemed overinclusive: "Clearly all nudity
cannot be deemed obscene even as to minors." Id. at 213. The traffic justification advanced
by the city was summarily dismissed as underinclusive and makeweight: "There is no reason
to think that a wide variety of other scenes in the customary screen diet, ranging from soap
opera to violence, would be any less distracting to the passing motorist." Id. at 214-15.
58. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
59. Id. at 51. Plaintiff also claimed that the ordinance violated the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was vague. The Court rejected this contention. Id.
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Detroit enacted an "anti-skid row ordinance" which prohibited
adult movie theaters from locating less than 1000 feet from an-
other adult movie theater.60 Plaintiff, owner of an adult motion
picture theater, asserted that the ordinance violated his First
Amendment rights as a prior restraint on protected speech.6 1 The
expressed purpose of the Detroit ordinance was to prevent the un-
wholesome effects of allowing such establishments to congregate in
one area. The results of such congregation, "[iun the opinion of ur-
ban planners and real estate experts who supported the ordi-
nances," included the attraction of "an undesirable quantity and
quality of transients," the diminution of property values, "an in-
crease in crime, especially prostitution," and the encouragement of
"residents and businesses to move elsewhere. 6 2 To the Court,
these police power purposes were sufficient to support the restric-
tion, even in light of its effect upon constitutional expression. De-
terminative for the Court was the fact that the ordinance did not
totally suppress, but merely regulated, the location of such expres-
sion.63 The only remaining question for the Court was whether the
means employed to accomplish a legitimate municipal police power
goal, that is, the preservation of "the character of [the city's]
neighborhoods,"' " was constitutionally acceptable. The Court de-
ferred to the city's judgment:
60. Id. at 54.
61. The Supreme Court employs a strict scrutiny approach in noncommercial speech
cases. Local regulatory infringements of First Amendment rights must be justified by a state
interest "sufficiently compelling," Wooley v. Maynard, 439 U.S. 705, 716 (1977), furthered
by the least intrusive means possible, Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362-63 (1976), Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976), where the means bear a "substantial relation" to the compel-
ling governmental interest, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976). The state interest must
be "unrelated to the suppression of expression," Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413
(1974), and may be so deemed if the restriction is a reasonable "time, place and manner"
regulation, Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1977).
Different types of expression are accorded different weights by the Court See Virginia
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The
Court in Young scrutinized the content of the expression restricted by Detroit's ordinance
to conclude: "[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the
total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value... we hold that
the State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the basis for placing them
in a different classification from other motion pictures." 427 U.S. at 70-71.
62. Id. at 55.
63. Id. at 71. The Court stated: "[t]he city's interest in planning and regulating the
use of property for commercial purposes is clearly adequate to support [the dispersal] re-
striction applicable to all theaters within the city limits." Id. at 62-63.
64. Id. at 71.
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It is not our function to appraise the wisdom of [the city's] deci-
sion to require adult theaters to be separated rather than concen-
trated in the same areas. . . .[T]he city's interest in attempting
to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded
high respect. Moreover, the city must be allowed a reasonable op-
portunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious
problems6 5
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,6 the Court found the
means employed under municipal police powers to be constitution-
ally unacceptable because they infringed upon a "fundamental" in-
terest. East Cleveland enacted an ordinance limiting occupancy of
single family units to "families." The ordinance defined "family"
so as to prohibit appellant grandmother from having her two
grandchildren, of different children, live with her. This living ar-
rangement constituted a criminal offense under the ordinance. 7
The City asserted that the ordinance was enacted to prevent
overcrowding, minimize traffic and parking congestion, and avoid
undue financial burdens on East Cleveland schools.68 The Court
stated that although "these are legitimate [police power] goals," 69
the ordinance infringed upon the fundamental constitutional inter-
ests of marriage and family choices protected under the due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 0 The Court distin-
guished Belle Terre because the ordinance in that case related only
to unrelated individuals.7 1
When a city undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family
... the usual judicial deference to the legislature is inappropriate
.... [W]hen the government intrudes on choices concerning
family living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the
importance of the governmental interests advanced and the ex-
tent to which they are served by the challenged regulation.72
65. Id.
66. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
67. Id. at 496.
68. Id. at 499-500.
69. Id. at 500.
70. Id. at 499.
71. Id. at 498.
72. Id. at 499. The Court noted the problems encountered by the judiciary when en-
tering the realm of "substantive due process": "There are risks when the judicial branch
gives enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without the guidance of the more
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights .... [H]istory counsels caution and restraint. But
it does not counsel... cutting off any protection of family rights at the first convenient, if
arbitrary boundary-the boundary of the nuclear family." Id. at 502 (emphasis in original).
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The Court found that East Cleveland's ordinance had "but a tenu-
ous relation to the alleviation of the conditions mentioned by the
city. ' 78 The Court, therefore, held the ordinance unconstitutional
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court's analysis in Moore precluded it from directly ad-
dressing the question of whether or not East Cleveland's ordinance
violated the equal protection clause in its disproportionately ad-
verse impact on racial minorities.74 This issue was squarely faced
by the Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.7 5 In Arlington Heights, the city de-
nied the Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation
(MHDC) a rezoning permit from a single to multi-family classifica-
tion which MHDC sought in order to construct 190 federally-subsi-
dized units for low and moderate income tenants.7 Federal funds
were partially conditioned upon "an affirmative marketing plan
designed to assure that [the] development [would be] racially inte-
grated. '77 MHDC alleged that Arlington Heights' denial was ra-
cially discriminatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 8
Opponents of the rezoning asserted two justifications for the
73. Id. at 500. The Court gave an example of the tenuous relationship: "[T]he ordi-
nance permits any family consisting only of husband, wife, and unmarried children to live
together, even if the family contains a half dozen licensed drivers, each with his or her own
car. At the same time it forbids an adult brother and sister to share a household, even if
both faithfully use public transportation. .. ." Id.
74. Id. at 496 n.3. Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, concurred in
the Moore opinion, adding the following: "I do not wish to be understood as implying that
East Cleveland's enforcement of its ordinance is motivated by a racially discriminatory pur-
pose: the record in this case would not support that implication. But the prominence of
other than nuclear families among ethnic and racial minority groups, including our black
citizens, surely demonstrates that the 'extended family' pattern remains a vital tenet of our
society. It suffices that in prohibiting this pattern of family living as a means of achieving its
objectives, appellant city has chosen a device thht deeply intrudes into family associational
rights that historically have been central, and today remain central, to a large proportion of
our population." Id. at 510.
75. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
76. Id. at 254.
77. Id. at 257.
78. The rezoning proposal was considered at three public hearings during which both
opponents and supporters of the rezoning "addressed what was referred to as the 'social
issue'-the desirability or undesirability of introducing at this location. . . low- and moder-
ate-income housing.., that would probably be racially integrated." Id. at 257-58.
The court of appeals held that the rezoning denial had racially discriminatory effects
and could be tolerated only if it served compelling governmental interests. The court of
appeals found that "[n]either the buffer policy nor the desire to protect property values met
this exacting standard." Id. at 260.
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Village's refusal:
1. Rezoning threatened to 'cause a measurable drop in
property value for neighboring sites.
2. The Village's apartment policy, adopted by the Village
Board in 1962 and amended in 1970, called for apart-
ment zoning primarily to serve as a buffer between sin-
gle-family development and commercial or manufactur-
ing districts. The proposed project did not meet this
requirement. 9
The Supreme Court accepted these justifications as legitimate
police power purposes and put forth a standard of review for cases
involving charges of discriminatory intent. The Court noted that
"the generous Euclid test, recently reaffirmed in Belle Terre" was
inapplicable in this case.80 The Court stated that judicial deference
is not justified when there is proof that a discriminatory purpose
has been a motivating factor in a local land use decision. 1 The
Court explained that "racially discriminatory intent or purpose is
required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."8 2 In
order to determine whether a discriminatory purpose was a moti-
vating factor, the Court must make a "sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available."83
The Court emphasized that a plaintiff need not prove that a gov-
ernmental action was undertaken solely for a discriminatory pur-
pose since it can rarely be said that a legislative body is "moti-
vated solely by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose
[is] the 'dominant' or 'primary' one."'" However, proof of a racially
discriminatory purpose is the "required threshold showing."85 Once
a plaintiff proves that a governmental action is "motivated in part
by a racially discriminatory purpose," the burden shifts to the gov-
ernment to establish "that the same decision would have resulted
79. Id. at 258.
80. Id. at 263.
81. Id. at 265-66.
82. Id. at 265. The Court provided a partial list of "circumstantial and direct evidence
of intent" from which evidence of a discriminatory motivation purpose may be gleaned:
(1) Disproportionate racial impact of official action, id. at 266; (2) Historical background of
the decision, id. at 267; (3) Legislative or administrative history, especially where there are
contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body, id. at 268.
83. Id. at 266.
84. Id. at 270-71 n.21.
85. Id.
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even had the impermissible purpose not been considered.""6
MHDC failed to establish this threshold showing of discrimi-
natory purpose.87 MHDC could only show proof of disproportion-
ate impact."" The Court, therefore, held that no constitutional vio-
lation had been shown.89
The Court's two most recent land use decisions reaffirm its
deferential approach. In both cases the Court considered the ques-
tion of whether the local restriction was so onerous to plaintiffs as
to require monetary compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment due process clauses. In Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City,9" the City enacted legislation intended to
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 269. The historical background of the decision evoked no suspicion: the land
had been zoned for single family homes since 1959; the buffer policy was in effect long
before MHDC requested rezoning and had been applied "too consistently. . .to infer dis-
criminatory purpose from its application in this case," id. at 270; the "rezoning request
progressed according to the usual procedures," id. at 269; and "there [had] been reliance by
some neighboring property owners on the maintenance of single family zoning in the vicin-
ity," id. at 270. The legislative and administrative history of the decision also disclosed no
discriminatory motive: public hearing minutes disclosed that the Plan Commission and Vil-
lage Board members "focused almost exclusively on the zoning aspects of the MHDC peti-
tion," id. at 270, and although some individuals who spoke at the public hearing "might
have been motivated by opposition to minority groups ... that evidence 'does not warrant
the conclusion that this motivated the defendants.'" Id. at 269.
The Court in Arlington Heights did not specifically address the legitimacy of the police
power goals of the ordinance in question. The Court merely accepted the appropriateness of
Arlington Heights' "buffer policy" and its desire to protect property values: "the zoning
factors on which [the local legislature] relied are not novel criteria in the Village's zoning
decisions." Id. at 270. The Court's strict scrutiny did not go to the merits of police purposes
advanced by the Village. Rather, the Court's scrutiny went only to the merits of MHDC's
allegations that discriminatory motives prompted the Village's refusal to rezone. Had
MHDC been able to show one discriminatory factor, the burden of proof would have shifted
to the Village. The Village would have then had to show that the same decision would have
resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered. Id. at 270-71 n.21. At
that point, the Court would have presumably scrutinized more closely the legitimacy of po-
lice power purposes asserted by the Village for its refusal to rezone. Hence, although the
Court espoused the strict scrutiny standard in Arlington Heights, strict scrutiny was ap-
plied only to the "circumstantial and direct evidence of [the governmental body's discrimi-
natory] intent." Id. at 266.
89. The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine the statutory
question: whether the rezoning decision violated the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§
3601-3631 (1976). 429 U.S. at 271.
90. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Plaintiff, owner of Penn Central Terminal, challenged the
city's ordinance under which the station had been designated p historical landmark, since
the designation precluded the owners from allowing VAP Properties to construct a multi-
story structure over the station.
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preserve "'the standing of [New York City] as a world-wide tourist
center and world capital of business, culture and government.' "91
The legislation was intended "to protect historic landmarks and
neighborhoods from precipitate decisions to destroy or fundamen-
tally alter their characters. '92 The New York Preservation Law of
1965 was enacted pursuant to the New York State Enabling Act
which declares that "it is the public policy of the State of New
York to preserve structures and areas with special historical or aes-
thetic interest or value and authorizes local governments to impose
reasonable restrictions to perpetuate such structures or areas.' ' 93
The New York City statute was intended to promote the general
welfare by:
1. fostering "civic pride in the beautiful and noble accom-
plishments of the past";
2. protecting and enhancing "the city's attractions to tour-
ists and visitors";
3. supporting and stimulating business and industry;
4. strengthening the economy of the city; and
5. promoting the use of historic districts, landmarks, inte-
rior landmarks and scenic landmarks for the, education,
pleasure, and welfare of the people of the city."
The police power justifications for New York's statutory restric-
tions were not scrutinized by the Court since the owners of the
property did "not contest that New York City's objective of pre-
serving structures and areas with special historic, architectural, or
cultural significance is an entirely permissible governmental
goal":9 5 "[T]his Court has recognized, in a number of settings, that
states and cities may enact land-use restrictions or controls to en-
hance the quality of urban life by preserving the character and de-
sirable aesthetic features of a city . ... 96
91. Id. at 109.
92. Id.
93. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 96-a (McKinney 1977). See also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. at 108-09 n.5.
94. Id. at 109.
95. Id. at 129. The Court held further: "[T]he application of New York City's
Landmarks Law has not effected a 'taking' of appellants' property. The restrictions imposed
are substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reason-
able beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities further to
enhance not only the Terminal site proper but also other properties [through transfer devel-
opment rights]." Id. at 138.
96. Id. at 129.
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The Court used similarly expansive language in Agins v. City
of Tiburon97 to describe the scope of legitimate police power goals.
The city was required, under state law, to prepare a general plan
for land use containing an open space element in order to "discour-
age the premature and unnecessary conversion of open-space land
to urban uses" and to assure "the continued availability of land for
the production of food and fiber, for the enjoyment of scenic
beauty, for recreation and for the use of natural resources." 8 The
question before the Court was "whether the mere enactment of the
zoning ordinances constitutes a taking." 99 To address this issue,
the Court first had to delineate the proper scope of the police
power by determining whether the ordinance substantially ad-
vanced "legitimate state interests."
The Court scrutinized the city's expressed purposes for the
ordinance:
[i]t is in the public interest to avoid unnecessary conversion of
open space land to strictly urban uses, thereby protecting against
the resultant adverse impacts, such as air, noise, and water pollu-
tion, traffic congestion, destruction of scenic beauty, disturbance
of the ecology and the environment, hazards related to geology,
fire and flood, and other demonstrated consequences of urban
sprawl. 00
The Court held that the ordinance in question substantially ad-
vanced legitimate state interests:
The specific zoning regulations at issue are exercises of the city's
police power to protect the residents of Tiburon from the ill-ef-
fects of urbanization. Such governmental purposes long have been
recognized as legitimate .... [The ordinances serve] the city's
interest in assuring careful and orderly development of residential
property with provision for open space. 10'
C. Exclusionary Regulations in Traditional Courts
Traditional courts like the Supreme Court will overturn few
97. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
98. Id. at 261 n.7.
99. Id. at 260. Plaintiffs challenged the ordinance as an unconstitutional taking with-
out due process of law because the ordinance allowed only one to five units to be con-
structed on their parcel. Id. at 258. However, plaintiffs did not seek approval for develop-
ment under the ordinance. Id.
100. Id. at 261 n.8.
101. Id. at 261.
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municipal land use restrictions on constitutional grounds. The
Court will defer to the local justifications for restrictive regulations
as long as a municipality acts within the bounds of broadly defined
police powers delegated by state enabling statutes, and where the
challenger fails to:
1. assert the unconstitutional infringement of a constitu-
tional right, such as freedom of expression, due process
or equal protection; or
2. allege the unconstitutional infringement of a constitu-
tionally protected "fundamental interest," such as mar-
riage or the family.'
Under this approach, challengers to exclusionary practices will
have little success in the Supreme Court or in courts which are
similarly deferential to local land use decisions. The Court recog-
nizes few constitutional rights or interests which will require a re-
versal of the burden of proof or a piercing of the presumption of
validity.'03 The result is that close scrutiny of the purposes behind
regulations which have an exclusionary effect is rarely available.
Municipalities may "act discreetly" to systematically deprive hous-
ing opportunities, so long as the municipality's purpose behind the
restriction is to suppress the "ill-effects of urbanization"'0 4 and to
enhance "the quality of urban life."' 0 5
102. The phrase "unconstitutional infringement" is meant to emphasize that a restric-
tion may affect a constitutional right or fundamental interest, yet may not infringe to a
magnitude which violates the Constitution. See notes 30-31 supra. Challenges based on the
right to travel, see Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D.
Cal. 1974), rev'd 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); or the right
to privacy, see Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), do not serve to reverse the presump-
tion of validity of ordinances exclusionary in effect.
103. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 261.
104. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 129.
105. See notes 25-27 and accompanying text supra. See generally Sturges v. Town of
Chilmark, 402 N.E.2d 1346 (Mass. 1980). Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a zon-
ing bylaw which limited the number of building permits issuable "to one tenth of the lots in
a 'subdivision' in the year the lots are subdivided and a further one tenth of those lots in
each of the subsequent nine years." Id. at 1349. The court noted that Chilmark is located on
Martha's Vineyard, in "an isolated, substantially rural area" and stated that the "public
interest" is different in rural and urban areas: "[In a rural ... setting, where no showing
has been made of regional demand for primary housing, the public interest in preserving the
environment and protecting a way of life may outweigh whatever undesirable economic and
social consequences inherent in partly 'closing the doors' to affluent outsiders primarily
seeking vacation homes." Id. at 1352. In addition, the state legislature had specifically ex-
pressed concern for the preservation of the "'natural, historical, ecological, scientific, or cul-
tural values on Martha's Vineyard,"' and the town was therefore serving regional as op-
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III. State Courts: Innovative Approaches
Although state court approaches vary widely between jurisdic-
tions, there is a growing trend to more closely scrutinize police
power purposes when the effect of land use regulation is exclusion-
ary. State courts are beginning to demand that local governments
justify restrictions with sufficient study and documentation. State
courts are also often more willing to substitute judicial judgment
for local legislative judgment on the necessity and effectiveness of
regulation. 06
This trend is in part the result of a redefinition of "general
welfare": courts scrutinize a local regulation's impacts on not only
the enacting municipality, but on the region as a whole. Municipal-
ities in these jurisdictions are required to act for the benefit of a
region, as opposed to acting merely for the benefit of local re-
posed to merely local needs. Id. The court stated that although the statute would be
presumed constitutionally valid, id., "the municipality [must] bring forward some indication
that the zoning provision has some reasonable prospect of a tangible benefit to the commu-
nity." Id. at 1353. The town relied on studies of soil limitations for water supply and sewage
disposal, id., and thereby established a "prima facie showing of a rational reason for its
action." Id. at 1354. The burden of proof then shifted to the plaintiffs to show that "the
studies did not support these concerns." Plaintiffs failed to bring forth such evidence, and
the court upheld the temporary growth restriction. Id. at 1355. The court noted: "We ex-
press no view on the application of the rate of development by-law in subsequent years,
particularly after the first ten years from its effective date. We assume, in the absence of a
contrary showing, that a period of ten years is reasonably necessary to complete all neces-
sary studies and to implement recommendations and that the town Rill proceed with its
studies in good faith. A very different case would be presented if it were determined that
the town was not proceeding with the necessary studies which are said to be the basis for
the enactment of the rate of development by-law." Id. at 1354 n.16.
106. The leading case in this field is Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Town-
ship of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied,
423 U.S. 808 (1975). The New Jersey Supreme Court stated: "[I]t is fundamental and not to
be forgotten that the zoning power is a police power of the state and the local authority is
acting only as a delegate of that power and is restricted in the same manner as is the state.
So, when regulation does have a substantial external impact, the welfare of the state's citi-
zens beyond the borders of the particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must be
recognized and served." 67 N.J. at 177, 336 A.2d at 726. Cf. Save a Valuable Environment v.
City of Bothell, 89 Wash. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978). The court held the city's rezoning
action to permit construction of a shopping center unconstitutional because rezoning would
cause serious adverse environmental consequences: "[The City] may not act in disregard of
the effects outside its boundaries. Where the potential exists that a zoning action will cause
a serious environmental effect outside jurisdictional borders, the zoning body must serve the
welfare of the entire affected community. If it does not do so, it acts in an arbitrary and
capricious manner. The precise boundaries of the affected community cannot be determined
until the potential environmental effects are understood." Id. at 867, 576 P.2d at 405.
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sidents by maintaining the status quo. 10 7 This trend is also par-
tially the result of judicial recognition that housing problems are
becoming severe, particularly for low and moderate income indi-
viduals. These courts interpret the police power flexibly in order
"to address new controversies in light of changing societal values
and convictions."10 8 When municipalities in these jurisdictions en-
act regulations that exacerbate housing shortages, courts may re-
quire a strong showing of public welfare purpose in order to allow
the restriction to stand.109 Three recent state supreme court deci-
sions will serve to illustrate the judicial trend toward stricter scru-
tiny of local regulations which have the potential to exclude.
In Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper Brookville,1 0
the New York Supreme Court scrutinized the Village's five-acre
minimum lot zoning ordinance for constitutional validity. The Vil-
lage argued that the primary purpose of the five-acre zoning was
not to prevent the entry of newcomers, but merely to avoid future
burdens, economic and otherwise, upon the administration of pub-
lic services and facilities. The Village additionally asserted that the
ordinance was enacted to preserve open space. 1
Plaintiffs showed, by analyzing the ordinance's legislative his-
tory, that the Village intended to accomplish different goals in en-
acting the five-acre minimum. Plaintiffs submitted the testimony
of the planning expert retained by the Village to show that the
purpose of the five-acre minimum was in fact to allow the Village
107. Godschalk, supra note 6, at 10. Cf. Sturges v. Town of Chilnark, 402 N.E.2d 1346
(Mass. 1980) in which the town enacted a youth lot exemption from lot size requirements
"'[flor the purpose of helping young people who have grown up in Chilmark and lived here
for a substantial portion of their lives and who, because of the rising land prices, have been
unable to obtain suitable land for their permanent homes at a reasonable price, and who
desire to continue to live in Chilmark."' Id. at 1348.
108. Clearly, there are potential problems with a narrow judicial focus on the ex-
pressed public welfare purposes of an ordinance, iince motives are often difficult to fathom
and the invalid motives of a handful of decisionmakers should not necessarily serve to inval-
idate an otherwise legitimate ordinance. See note 17 supra. Courts can, however, demand
sufficient study and documentation to demonstrate the reasonableness of a particular police
power purpose: for example, a municipality enacting an exclusionary restriction in order to
prevent adverse impact on sewage capacity should be required to provide sufficient docu-
mentation to show that an adverse impact will, in fact, occur if the restriction is not en-
acted. See note 107 and accompanying text supra; note 141 and accompanying text infra.
109. Id.
110. 67 A.D.2d 70, 414 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1979).
111. Id. at 78, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
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112to maintain its status quo. The court held that this showing was
sufficient to satisfy plaintiffs' burden of proving an invalid police
power purpose.11 3
The record demonstrates beyond peradventure of doubt that the
leaders of the village, after consulting with some of the large land-
owners, decided to use their zoning power to preserve the village
as a citadel of privilege. Thus their zoning power was not being
used as a proper exercise of the police power to serve the [re-
gional] general welfare but rather to stop the march of progress
and to preserve special benefits for the privileged group of large
landowners which consists mainly of present residents of the
village.""'
The court then scrutinized the police power justifications advanced
by the municipality for the restriction. The court noted first that
the restriction was not justified as an attempt to obviate future
burdens on services and facilities since improper "exclusion of
newcomers includes both selective admission as well as total exclu-
sion.' 1 5 Based on the record available, the court deemed the Vil-
lage's second justification, to preserve open space, to be a "make-
weight argument." 6
Since the court found that the Village had not enacted the re-
striction for legitimate purposes, the court held the five-acre mini-
mum "unconstitutional as an unreasonable and improper exercise
of the police power.''1 7
The New Jersey Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion
when recently faced with a municipal restriction neutral on its
face. In Home Builders League of South Jersey, Inc. v. Township
of Berlin,"I8 the Township adopted an ordinance which imposed
minimum floor area requirements for residential dwellings. The or-
dinance did not tie the minima to occupancy or other factors such
as frontage or lot size. In fact, different minima were applied in
different areas of the townshii for the same type of unit."' The
112. Id.
113. Id. at 78, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
114. Id. at 81, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
115. Id. at 82, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 83, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
118. 81 N.J. 127, 405 A.2d 381 (1979).
119. Id. at 136, 405 A.2d at 386.
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Township asserted that the state enabling legislation 20 authorized
the municipality to regulate the size of buildings and percentage of
lot which may be occupied by buildings, and to zone "'with rea-
sonable consideration [for] the character of each district and its
peculiar suitability for particular uses."'12' The Township asserted
that the purposes for the regulation were to "(1) promote public
health and safety and (2) maintain the nature of residential neigh-
borhoods and conserve property values."' 22
The court stated that the state enabling statute "might be
read literally to include the power to impose minimum floor space"
requirements under the authority to regulate structures. 2 ' How-
ever, when "a zoning provision, in addition to promoting legitimate
zoning goals, also has effects contrary to the general welfare, closer
scrutiny of the provision and its effects must be undertaken."' 24
The court noted two "adverse consequences" of the floor area min-
ima: increased housing costs and a potential exclusionary effect.125
The court stated that municipalities enacting such restrictions
"will be presumed to have acted for improper purposes."'26 The
court set forth a two-tiered analysis for such cases. To rebut the
presumption of invalidity, the municipality must establish a "valid
basis" for the restriction. If a municipality succeeds in establishing
a valid basis, the court must then determine "whether the provi-
sion furthers or is contrary to the general welfare [by] weigh[ing]
and balanc[ing] . . . the exclusionary and salutary effects of the
provision.11 7
The court then considered the bases advanced by the Town-
ship. The court stated that although promotion of health and
120. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-1 to -65 (West Supp. 1980-1981).
121. 81 N.J. at 138, 405 A.2d at 387 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62(a) (West
Supp. 1980-1981)).
122. 81 N.J. at 142, 405 A.2d at 387.
123. Id. at 138, 405 A.2d at 388.
124. Id. The court noted that in this case, the effect of the floor area requirements
"bear a direct relationship to the cost of a house" and therefore had the "potential [for]
exclusionary effects." If it could be shown that the "[t]ownship's sole purpose in setting up
the minima" was to discriminate on economic grounds, the court noted that the minima
would be stricken as unconstitutional. Id. at 141, 405 A.2d at 389. Such evidence was not
advanced by plaintiffs.
125. Id. at 139-40, 405 A.2d at 389.
126. Id. at 142, 405 A.2d at 389.
127. Id. at 142, 405 A.2d at 389-90. Evidence was received from a doctor, a land plan-
ner, a housing consultant and a law professor. Id.
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safety are legitimate police power purposes, "minimum floor area
requirements are not per se related to public health, safety or
morals. ' 128 This finding was supported by "substantial evidence"
in the record from various experts.12 9 Since the Township required
different minima in different areas of the city for the same type of
unit, the court found that the Township could not have been "con-
sidering health, safety, and morals when it enacted these
provisions."18 0
The court found the second rationale advanced by the town-
ship, the preservation of the character of neighborhoods and con-
servation of property values, also to be legitimate police power
purposes.131 However, since the ordinance had an exclusionary ef-
fect, the municipality was required to show that "the size of a
house [bore] a reasonable relationship to the character of the
neighborhood including maintenance of land values. 1 3 2 The
Township failed to establish this, and plaintiffs provided sufficient
evidence to establish the contrary.1 33
The Township failed to show a connection between the min-
ima and legitimate police power purposes. The court concluded
that "the ordinance appears to be directed solely toward economic
segregation. 1 34 Since the municipality did not provide adequate
documentation to show the reasonable success of the restriction in
accomplishing its stated objectives, the court substituted its own
judgment to determine what the municipality intended to
accomplish.
Similarly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found a town's
comprehensive "slow-growth" ordinance potentially exclusionary
in Beck v. Town of Raymond. 35 Pursuant to the state zoning ena-
128. Id. at 142, 405 A.2d at 389.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 143, 405 A.2d at 390-91.
131. Id. at 148 n.6, 405 A.2d at 392 n.6.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 148, 405 A.2d at 392.
134. Id.
135. 118 N.H. 793, 394 A.2d 847 (1978). Following Beck, the New Hampshire state
legislature enacted N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:62-b (Supp. 1979) which specifically autho-
rizes temporary growth restrictions: "In unusual circumstances requiring prompt attention
and for the purpose of developing or altering a growth management process ... or a master
plan or capital improvement program, a city or town may adopt an ordinance imposing
interim regulations upon development. . . ." See Conway v. Town of Stratham, 120 N.H.
257, 414 A.2d 539 (1980) (holding that the town's enactment of a slow growth ordinance
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bling act,136 the town enacted an ordinance which limited the avail-
ability of building permits to individual landowners in each build-
ing year (April 1 to March 31) to:
Four permits per year for owners of fifty or more acres;
Three permits per year for owners of twenty-five to fifty acres;
Two permits per year for owners of ten to twenty acres; and
One permit per year for owners of less than ten acres.137
The purpose for the ordinance advanced by the town was to re-
strain rapid growth in order" 'to prevent overcrowding [of] schools
and the overburdening of [the town's] taxpayers.' "IS" The court
recognized that the zoning enabling legislation provided the town
with authority to regulate growth,13 but noted that this authority
was subject to limitation. The court stated that comprehensive
growth controls "should be the product of careful study," accom-
panied by "[g]ood faith efforts to increase the capacity of munici-
pal services," 140 and "must not be imposed simply to exclude out-
siders . . . especially outsiders of any disadvantaged social or
economic group.1' 41 The Town of Raymond had not undertaken a
does not improperly infringe upon the jurisdiction of the planning board).
136. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:60-:89 (1970).
137. 118 N.H. at 795, 394 A.2d at 848. Four days after enacting the zoning amend-
ment, the town passed a general ordinance "substantially identical to the zoning ordinance."
Id. The court held that the general ordinance was not "a valid exercise of the police power
delegated to the municipality" under general enabling legislation. Id. at 795, 394 A.2d at
849. The court held that an ordinance so comprehensive in nature and "'not intended to be
integrated into previous enactments as part of an over all, regulatory scheme,"' must be
enacted pursuant to the state zoning enabling act. Id. at 799, 394 A.2d at 851 (quoting
Village House, Inc. v. Louden, 114 N.H. 76, 79, 314 A.2d 635, 637 (1974)). Plaintiff claimed
that he was protected under the "'grandfather clause"' exemption of the zoning enabling
act since the zoning ordinances were enacted subsequent to "'active and substantial devel-
opment... within twelve months of the recording of subdivision plans .... ' The court
agreed. 118 N.H. at 797, 394 A.2d at 849.
138. Id. at 795, 394 A.2d at 849 (quoting the lower court's findings).
139. Id. at 798-99, 394 A.2d at 852. The court cited Patenaude v. Town of Meredith,
118 N.H. 616, 621, 392 A.2d 582, 585 (1978), for the rule that "[c]omprehensive planning
with a solid scientific, statistical basis is the key element in land use regulation in New
Hampshire."
140. 118 N.H. at 800-01, 394 A.2d at 852. The court offered a solution "to the problem
of parochial growth restrictions": "[R]egional or state-wide land-use planning ... could co-
ordinate responses to the population escalation in New Hampshire, thereby eliminating the
present disparities existing between towns, and insuring that each municipality bears its fair
share of the burden of increased growth. . ..
"Communities may wish to examine the feasibility of seeking greater state participation
in solving what is essentially a state problem." Id. at 801-02, 394 A.2d at 852-53.
141. Id. at 801, 394 A.2d at 852.
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study to justify the restriction nor was the ordinance part of a
comprehensive plan. The court upheld Raymond's "ordinance only
as a temporary emergency measure to allow the town two years at
most to develop a . . comprehensive plan for phasing in
growth. ' 142 In so holding, the court made its own assessment of the
purpose for Raymond's restriction:
Its apparent primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of new-
comers in order to avoid burdens upon the public services and
facilities. This alone is not a valid public purpose. Moreover, the
great bulk of such expenses as sewer and water lines and streets
are usually forced upon the developer and in turn upon the ulti-
mate homeowners. Towns may not refuse to confront the future
by building a moat around themselves and pulling up the
drawbridge.14
3
IV. Conclusion
These state court decisions illustrate methods by which courts
can pierce the "public welfare" purpose which has shielded munici-
palities in deferential courts. Traditionally, municipalities have
been able to justify regulations which have an exclusionary effect
merely by declaring that the purpose of the restriction is to pro-
mote "the quality of urban life" so long as the restriction did not
infringe a constitutional right. Innovative courts will accept a mu-
nicipality's assertion that the promotion of "the quality of urban
life" is a legitimate governmental purpose but, when faced with
exclusionary regulations, will further inquire whether illegitimate
purposes prompted enactment or whether the means chosen will
actually accomplish the purposes asserted. Traditional courts ac-
cept the notion that the inevitable effect of land use restrictions is
to exclude certain uses. Innovative courts accept the same notion,
but have, invalidated those restrictions which appear to be aimed
at excluding low and moderate income residents.
Traditional and innovative courts approach the issue from dif-
ferent directions. Traditional courts focus on the rights of the chal-
lenger and query whether the restriction violates some recognized
constitutional right. Innovative courts focus on the scope of the
municipality's police power, on the definition of the public welfare,
142. Id.
143. Id.
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and query whether the restriction is justified in light of its exclu-
sionary effects.
Clearly, the extent to which a court will intervene is not solely
based upon the limits of presumptions in judicial interpretations.
Other policy and political questions are also at stake.144 Some com-
mentators assert that these issues are more properly in the prov-
ince of state legislatures. Commentators assert that state legisla-
tures should provide guidance to local governments on how best to
address common problems such as rapid growth so that exclusion-
ary effects are not so severe.145 State governments are beginning to
respond with various techniques. 146 Nevertheless, as long as local
governments continue to enact restrictive land use regulations to
maintain "citadels of privilege," there is an important role for in-
novative courts to play in ensuring adequate access to housing op-
portunities for all. Judicial approaches which presume valid those
regulations which unnecessarily raise the cost of housing and
thereby exclude, or which by other means in effect exclude low and
moderate income individuals, appear archaic in light of today's
housing crisis.147 Municipal restrictions which in effect exclude
should be justified with sufficient study and documentation. Mu-
nicipalities should be required to show that strong countervailing
public welfare purposes can in fact be accomplished by restrictions
employed, and that there are no alternative methods available
which could accomplish the same strong purposes in a less exclu-
sionary manner.1 48
The Supreme Court, in its first validation of zoning, recog-
nized the possibility of future cases "where the general public in-
terest would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that
the municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way. 149 The
day has come when municipalities which act discreetly to exclude
144. See note 6 supra.
145. Beck v. Town of Raymond, 118 N.H. at 801, 394 A.2d at 852.
146. See note 7 supra. See also Bosselnan, supra note 3, at 3 (discussing state ap-
proaches in Florida, Hawaii and Minnesota); Heeter, Almost Getting it Together in Ver-
mont, in ENMRONMENTAL AND LAND CoNTRoLs LEGISLATION 335 (D. Mandelker ed. 1976).
147. See Ellickson, supra note 6. "Legislatures seldom explicitly authorize municipali-
ties to pursue... parochial land use policies .... Most enabling acts that bestow plan-
ning and taxing authority are vague and open-ended. Where this is so, the propriety of
active judicial scrutiny to prevent discrimination against outsiders is unquestionable." Id. at
473.
148. Id.
149. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. at 390.
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should no longer be allowed to hide behind the presumption of va-
lidity. Altered judicial approaches are appropriate in light of
changing conditions.
[W]hile the meaning of constitutional guarantees never varies, the
scope of their application must expand or contract to meet new
and different conditions which are constantly coming within the
field of their operation. In a'changing world, it is impossible that
it should be otherwise.15°
150, Id. at 387.
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